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Is a new administrative division reform necessary?
A voice in the discussion on self-government
reform
T
he ongoing discussion in many communities in Poland (elected local
government members, scientists engaged in the subject, central-level
politicians) on a necessity of implementing a new administrative division
reform, calls for a situational overview. All existing discussions, on the
central level and specifically in the Sejm, treating on metropolitan powiats
seem to be out of touch with reality and require a question: What is the
purpose of these attempts to push this bill through? It should be added, that
a negative stand in this matter took, among others, the government and
a large group of self-government politicians. On the other hand, following
the Czech Republic’s example, there are calls to dismantle the institution
of powiats, or even proposals to return to 49-voivodeship system. It seems
that the sources of these discussions should be sought in what happened
with the proposal of the self-government and the new administrative divi-
sions reform in 1998. This allows to compose further questions, this time
on evaluation of then – implemented changes, not only from the perspec-
tive of local and regional communities, but also from the perspective of
the National interest. It’s worth reminding where the dismantling of
powiats and reducing the voivodeships have led.
The current form of the local and regional administration was ulti-
mately shaped by the Act on the Powiat-Level Self-Government and
the Act on the Voivodeship-Level Self-Government dated June 5, 1998
and the Act on Direct Elections of Gmina Administrators, Mayors and
City-Mayors dated June 20, 2002. The reform measures were initiated by
the Act on the Gmina-Level Self-government dated March 8, 1990. Ever
since then, the territorial self-government acts were revised multiple
times.
Enacting laws reforming the administrative division of the State was
possible thanks to implementation of the new Constitution. Very helpful in
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this matter were the provisions stating that the State’s territorial structure
will be based on the decentralization principle. Of course, this did not pre-
judge the existence of future gminas and powiats. Nevertheless, it made
the implementation of these objectives feasible by means of a statute (The
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 15). This regulation re-
sulted in ceding the power of restoring the three-level country division to
a statute. The Constitution only determined the existence of the territorial
self-government units inasmuch as, according to its content, the residents
of the territorial self-government units shall form a self-governing com-
munity in accordance with law (Konstytucja RP, Article 16 Paragraph 1).
The Constitution introduced a principle of subsidiarity as the foundation
of territorial system in Poland. This means that the bigger units of admin-
istrative division, and only then- central administration, perform their
public duties only if their size gives them an advantage over the smaller
units in terms of effectiveness. However, a question arises here: Where, in
fact, do the capabilities of smaller administrative division units end? It is
difficult to draw a clear-cut line in this matter.
The main purpose of the administrative division reform was sup-
posed to be a creation of strong, in territorial, economic and population
terms, regions. This would create realistic chances for them to function
as subjects of regional policies in the country and also, after accession, in
the European Union (Gilowska, Wysocka, P³oskonka, Prutis, Stec, 1997,
p. 17–18).
The administrative division reform met the expectations of a further
decentralization of public power, articulated mainly by self-government
activists. However, the vast majority of population believed that the re-
form was unnecessary. The planned reform awakened hopes that thanks to
the country’s decentralization – following the example of the European
Union Members – it would be easier to overcome the most severely felt
challenges of social problems. According to the bill’s creators, the basis of
the reform was “to build a public administration capable of solving prob-
lems at the level that is closest to the general public, and which allows to
control the officials” (Po co nam reforma administracji?, 1998, p. 3).
The previous administrative system of the Polish state was strongly
centralized. Each level of government had a very unclear sphere of
competence. The implemented in the 1975 reform led to a creation of
voivodeships, which weren’t regions in the geographical terms, nor in spa-
tial or historical. Moreover, they had a limited subjectivity (Gilowska,
Wysocka, P³oskonka, Prutis, Stec, 1997, p. 10).
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As a warning to those who support the liquidation of powiats, it’s
worth pointing out here the reform implemented in 1975 and its disastrous
effects on the functioning of the country and its administration. The Act on
the two-level administrative division of the State of May 28, 1975 com-
pletely changed the model of administrative division and the model of
local authorities and administration. One of the levels got eliminated
– a powiat. Moreover, abolished was the divide between cities of powiat
– and non-powiat status, and also the subdivisions of Poznañ, Gdañsk and
Szczecin (Gebert, 1975, p. 14–15).
One of the tasks carried out by powiats was to coordinate the mea-
sures of institutions fulfilling economic, social and cultural needs of cit-
ies and districts. By implementing the reform in 1972, the lawmakers
conveyed this responsibility on gminas. As a result, it led to a reduction
on auditing powers on powiat’s part, and also – as was expected – an
overgrowth of competences on the level of powiat. The decision to dis-
mantle the powiats and to fragment the regions, instead of reforming the
institution of powiat based on territorial extension and changes in re-
gards of competence and tasks, led to a decrease of the gap between
gminas and voivodeships on one hand, and a fragmentation and weaken-
ing of voivodeships on the other. Additionally, the liquidation of powiats
meant one more thing- elimination of leftover jurisdictional separations
between government and self-government administrations (Zakrzewski,
1976, p. 10–11).
At the heart of this reform was to make public authorities and adminis-
tration closer to citizens. Most of the public institutions’ competences
were concentrated in cities and gminas. This was – according to Stanis³aw
Gerbert – a very important feature of socialist statehood and acted as in-
strument to deepen the socialist democracy. However, attempts to bridge
the gap between the population and the government and administration
caused this gap to actually widen. This created a threat to efficiency of the
country’s administration, which would also influence the economic and
social development. The cities and gminas’ adoption of most tasks from
powiats was supposed to speed up aligning the standards of living in urban
and rural areas. The same purpose was in establishing common councils
for big cities and their surrounding gminas. This, however, created a threat
to areas surrounding cities. On one hand, cities could have been a positive
force in cultural, educational, scientific and industrial terms. On the other,
however, it made it possible to predominate the suburbs and to focus on
development of urban areas only (Gebert, 1975, p. 15–16).
SP 3 ’14 Is a new administrative division reform necessary?... 171
It would be interesting to learn what was the government’s reasoning
behind the purpose of implementing the new administrative division into
voivodeships. The government decided that the previous division into
voivodeships did not meet expectations of socio-economic development
and demands of rational land-use planning of the country. Additionally,
voivodeships allegedly did not form coherent regions, which would allow
a better coordination of actions leading to development both on the re-
gional level and nationwide (Bocheñski, Gebert, S³u¿ewski, 1977, p. 69).
It is hard to agree with some of these arguments, because by creating new
voivodeships the coherence of regions was even further diminished by the
additional fragmentation.
Any further reasoning to justify a validity of these decisions seems to
be even more inconclusive. The creation of new voivodeships led to – ac-
cording to administration – developing coherent regions, which bound-
aries were adapted to the already-formed economic structures of the
country. In drawing the boundaries of the new voivodeships, the adminis-
tration followed the criteria of: natural bonds in particular areas, sense of
community, characteristic natural conditions and habits, a specific type of
industry, specific to the area type of agriculture, special services and recre-
ational capabilities, gravitating towards one dominating environment (Bo-
cheñski, Gebert, S³u¿ewski, 1977, p. 69–70).
Whereas, in creating a voivodeship that cannot be an equivalent to a re-
gion, different criteria should be used. This area should be homogeneous
from a geographical, historical, environmental and cultural point. In the
area an independent ecological, social, economic, civilizational and cul-
tural policies should be – in accordance to its specifics – implemented by
the own regional institutions.
The administration did not meet any of these simple, as it seems, crite-
ria. Dismantling of the powiat and carrying most of its previous compe-
tences on gminas, while maintaining the big in size voivodeships, caused
even greater gap between residents of particular gminas – especially sub-
urban ones – and the decision-making center (Zawadzka, 1989, p. 289).
In creating new voivodeships the administration had absolutely no
concern about what was the most needed for the best functioning of the
State. Not without significance to the further development of the regions
was the fact that the big towns were stripped of the role of leading centers;
centers that were affecting the region by stimulating and leading the eco-
nomic, social, ecological, civilizational and cultural development. A bi-
zarre example here would be that cities with voivodeship rights: Kraków,
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Warszawa and £ódŸ, were completely stripped of their territorial support,
thus limiting their jurisdiction to city limits and a few adjacent gminas.
Competences given to voivodes were limited to representing the govern-
ment at the local level, and not to acting as a region’s host with deci-
sion-making abilities. The new, created in 1975, voivodeships differed
significantly in their economic development capabilities, to such a degree
that some of them had no such resources at all (Gilowska, Wysocka,
P³oskonka, Stec, 1997, p. 5).
The dismantling of regions brought yet another negative effect. Namely,
it led to an increase of territorial and special divisions. When drafting the
reform, no provisions regarding 20 of then-existing special divisions were
included. Their jurisdiction fell over powiats and voivodeships. This
meant that the extent of their tasks and competences of the first-level spe-
cial administration’s bodies, fell under a then-basic administrative unit
– a powiat. Introducing the new administrative division units in the form
of powiat and voivodeship led to a situation where it turned out that this
units were too small to be able to play a role of special division units.
Hence, under the government’s ordinance of May 30, 1975 on adjusting
the field organizational units to the new administrative division of the
State, new special territorial divisions were introduced. However, the in-
dispensability test was not applied, meaning that regardless of a new spe-
cial territorial unit being needed or not – it had to be created. As a result of
the actions taken under the government’s ordinance, local administrative
areas were created as supragmina special division units that covered
gminas or a town with adjacent gminas. Whereas the second-level constituted
of districts, creating supravoivodeship special division units. These covered
a few of neighboring voivodeships (Chróœcielewski, 1980, p. 97–99, Janku,
1981, p. 163–198).
Together with the liquidation of powiats, changed was the status of the
specialized units that were subordinate to the national councils and field
public administration. Until the reform, their competences fell within the
limits of a powiat. After the implementation of the reform, gminas turned
out to be too small of organizational units to be able to function as special-
ized units. Hence, these units got placed within district structures, but
– as subsidiary division units. Organizational structures of the subsidiary
division units did not operate in each gmina (Chróœcielewski, 1980,
p. 99–100).
The issue of the liquidation of powiats as well as shaping the bound-
aries of new voivodeships, indicate that the reform of 1975 from the very
SP 3 ’14 Is a new administrative division reform necessary?... 173
beginning was not well prepared. This was, indeed, a desirable situation
for the administration, because this strengthened the government’s role as
the only decision-making and governing center. The administration was
actually not thoroughly reformed. Vast majority of institutions, special
administration bodies and those functioning within powiats – formed
a so-called administrative districts. In sum, the reform of 1975 contributed
to the administrative collapse of the country; a country that, on the verge
of the 1990s, found itself at the eve of administrative efficiency collapse.
The only chance for development and proper functioning was an adminis-
tration and self-government reform.
The first phase of the reform consisted of passing the Act on Gmina-Level
Self-Government in 1990. Another step was supposed to be enacting the acts
on powiat and voivodeship self-government. The result of which – the
three-level administrative division was implemented. The Act on the three-
-level administrative division of the State led to the biggest controversies. On
January 8, 1998 the Sejm Deputies from Polish People’s Party submitted
a bill on the voivodeship self-government that was aimed to create a two-level
administrative division with a gmina as its first level. The second level was
supposed to consist of 49 voivodeships led by voivodes and regional parlia-
ments. About a month later, on February 6, 1998, the Sejm rejected the bill
(S³obodzian, 2006, p. 112–123; Olszewski, 2007, p. 119–120).
The Sejm Deputies from the Polish People’s Party probably wanted to
beat the government in proposing the bill and present them with a fait ac-
compli in case of a successful voting. The Government Plenipotentiary for
the System Reform, Micha³ Kulesza, after the Jerzy Buzek’s government
took over on October 31, 1997, was working on such bill. In his works, the
Plenipotentiary based mainly on the following criteria: geographical, his-
torical, cultural, environmental, functional, mass security – both internal
and external, social consensus, adjustment to European standards and fi-
nally, the National interest. This stand was also supported by analysis
of the Western Europe’s administrative division. A creation of 12 new
voivodeships was proposed, with an intermediate level – powiat. In accor-
dance with the bill received by the Sejm, the new administrative division
was to be implemented on January 1, 1999. The second level of self-gov-
ernment was supposed to be formed by 310 powiats and 47 towns ex-
cluded from the powiats (S³obodzian, 2006, p. 114–115; Piasecki, 2012,
p. 41–42; Miszczuk, 2003, p. 149–151).
Concurrently with the government’s proposals, a group of Democratic
Left Alliance deputies made a proposal of creating 17 voivodeships.
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Thereby, two bills made it to the Sejm at the same time. A decision thus
had to be made, as to which of the two bills was a leading one and which
will be an amendment to the main bill. This caused numerous disruptions.
Immediately many amendments emerged that amounted to increasing the
number of voivodeships to 16, 17, 18 and 27. A motion to keep the
49 voivodeships was also filed (S³obodzian, 2006, p. 117–119; Miszczuk,
p. 152–154; Habuda, 2005, p. 56–57, 59–61).
All the amendments, together with the deputies’ bill, were rejected.
A government’s bill, with a recommendation of enacting by means of
statue, on creation o 12 voivodeships was submitted to the Sejm. On June 5,
1998, during voting on a legislative package reforming the administrative
system of the State, the Sejm outvoted the government bill on 12 voi-
vodeships. Unfortunately, no lobbing – on the Sejm and the President’s
part – was conducted to enact the bill in the further legislation process
(Habuda, 2005, p. 57–58, 64). On June 19, 1982 the Senate amended the
bill by adding additional 3 voivodeships. On July 1, 1998, the Sejm passed
the Senate’s amendments and sent it to the President to be signed into
a law. The President vetoed the bill. In justifying his stand, he concluded
that the administrative division proposed by the Parliament was unconsti-
tutional because the existing social and cultural bonds were not consid-
ered. The President also suggested a creation of 2 additional voivodeships,
Old-Polish and Mid-Pomeranian (S³obodzian, 2006, p. 121–124; Pia-
secki, 2002, p. 42; Miszczuk, 2003, p. 156). Because the Mid-Pomeranian
voivodeship was supposed to be created on the area Aleksander Kwaœ-
niewski was originally from, a previous Koszalin Voivodeship, suspicions
started circulating that he vetoed the bill because it did not include this
voivodeship (Habuda, 2005, p. 57).
In searching for compromise between the deputies’bill that was not ac-
cepted by the President and the President’s suggestions that in turn were
not accepted by the deputies, a creation of 16 voivodeships, 308 powiats
and 65 towns on powiat’s rights was proposed. On July 24, 1998, the Sejm
passed the Bill, and the President signed into a law – the Act on
a three-level territorial division of the State (Piasecki, 2002, p. 42).
The implementation of 16 voivodeships is very arguable. Most of the
present voivodeships do not meet the criteria of modern Europeean re-
gions. A lack of any serious lobbying to create 12 voivodeships resulted in
proposals and even demands to form new voivodeships. Particular inter-
ests of local politicians started dominating; politicians who were in fear of
losing their lucrative positions. Additionally, there was a matter of divi-
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sion of forces in voivodeships between political groups, specifically be-
tween Solidarity Electoral Action and Democratic Left Alliance. Besides
the battle in the Parliament, “spontaneously organized” (or rather-orga-
nized by local politicians) protests started, as well as referendums and
even human chains from one voivodeship to another. Incidentally, the lo-
cal clergy was also involved in these actions. They were trying to prove
that some voivodeships, such as Opole Voivodeship, are regions in all re-
spects; which is definitely not true as some of the today’s powiats: Brzeg
and Namys³ów, are areas that geographically, culturally and environmen-
tally belong to Lower Silesia. The rest of today’s Opole Voivodeship con-
sists of the Upper Silesia, and Opole is a historical capital of Upper Silesia.
However, for the eastern part of Upper Silesia – a Silesia Voivodeship
name was given. It is an odd name, especially taking into consideration its
history and geography. Lower Silesia is also part of Silesia, and Wroc³aw
is after all a historical capital of the whole Silesia. Today’s Lubusz
Voivodeship is an artificial creation consisting in part of Lower Silesia,
Greater Poland and Western Pomerania voivodeships, and even Branden-
burg (Habuda, 2005, p. 56–59, 61–63; Habuda, 2009, p. 442–444).
By the way of these “spontaneous protests”, the discussion was getting
even more heated – which resulted in a lot of negative emotions towards
the adjacent voivodeships. The gap that was created then – is still visible
today. In two instances, a creation of 2 voivodeships: Lubusz and Kuyaw-
ian-Pomeranian, resulted in such strong tensions over where the capital
with a voivode was supposed to be located, that a division of offices had to
be decided upon. The most important element that was not exploited was
the local community mobilization. After saving the voivodeships, the so-
cial energy was not used to increase the importance of the voivodeship and
its development.
Looking back at the last 15 years of the functioning of the new
16 voivodeships, a valid argument emerges – that this division is inade-
quate to the real needs and criteria. Basing on pressures and particular in-
terests resulted in a lot of damage, especially in the area of economic
development (Habuda, 2005, p. 54–55; Habuda, p. 444–449).
The self-government reform of 1990 was justifiably limited to the
gmina level. Too many of issues were ill-equipped, e.g. municipal assets
on a voivodeship level or the number of voivodeships. They could have
led to a demise of the reform and discourage the idea of self-governance.
In implementing the reform in 1990 a solution was adapted to disen-
tangle, on a gmina level, executive and legislative powers. This was, how-
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ever, done with a detriment of executive power. A dominating position of
legislative power was pronounced. Finally, in 1995 there was an enact-
ment of provisions that strengthened the executive power. Albeit, a pri-
macy of the council as a control authority was sustained.
The reforms of 1990, 1998 and 2002 introduced many structural and
institutional changes. Above all, these reforms decentralized the deci-
sion-making process by transferring the decision-making competences to
gminas; executive competences were, simultaneously, restructured. To
follow this example, changed were also the competences of the central ad-
ministration and government administration in voivodeship, including
a voivode. Residents of gminas, powiats and voivodeships were also given
an opportunity to exercise their right to govern and to have an influence on
decision-making processes by means of elections or referendums. The
lawmaker did not implement any coercion in this matter. It’s the gmina’s
residents that have to decide whether they want to exercise the opportuni-
ties made available to them, or whether they want to remain passive.
The reforms completely changed the face of the State. It was assumed
that dividing administration competences between decision centers on
a local, regional and central level would improve the quality and effi-
ciency of governing. Certain mistakes were made, however. The most im-
portant one was that too many voivodeships were created. The optimum
solution would have been a creation of 9 strong voivodeships of large area,
high population and economic potential, based on historical and geo-
graphical grounds. Today’s 16 voivodeships are not embedded on any of
this elements. They are extremely diverse in terms of acreage, population
and economy. It results in their uneven development. Next to rich
voivodeships there are also poor ones. A fewer number of voivodeships
would ensure a more even development and better and more efficient gov-
erning of the country. The number of the mid-level units – powiats – raises
similar concerns. There should most definitely be fewer of them. As in the
issue of voivodeships, an uneven development has been observed. This
state of affairs consists of the same causes as in voivodeships.
Not all issues regarding gminas were regulated by the Act of 1990. Hence,
all the amendments that were implemented in 1990–2002 had two purposes:
1) to correct the “bungles”;
2) to increase the efficiency of self-government functioning.
This purpose was served by, inter alia, provisions that:
1) organized and clarified government administration competences re-
garding local government – by eliminating possibilities of competence
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conflicts; the less the state interventionism in the local government, the
better for the State itself;
2) clearly described the relations between gminas’ legislative and execu-
tive bodies;
3) clearly described tasks and competences of local government;
4) relayed new, further tasks to be fulfilled by particular levels of local
government according to the subsidiarity principle.
However, the efficiency of local government functioning constitutes of
more than just more tasks and competences. Above all, it constitutes of
clearly defined sources of revenue and an ability to freely dispose of it.
The efficiency of local government functioning is limited by a financial
barrier. These units should be subject to constitutional protection. In draft-
ing the new constitution in 1997, its creators included a very general pro-
vision, that in regards of financing – it refers to a statute, meaning the laws
of lower rank. It definitely weakens the local government’s position in fa-
vor of the government administration and its possibilities of measures. In
preparing the Constitution’s draft what should have been done was to
reach to already tried and tested European standards and to enclose the
provisions of local government financing in the Constitution, even if the
proportions of each sources that go to particular self-government level had
to be included. Thus, a comprehensive public finance reform is needed,
and a one that would also cover the local government’s matters.
The recurring in Poland voices to dismantle the powiats are based on
the Czech Republic’s example where, allegedly, the powiats were liqui-
dated. This is definitely not a good example because of the following rea-
sons: People who use this example as an argument to dismantle powiats in
Poland probably do not fully understand the specifics of administrative di-
vision in the Czech Republic. Size-wise this country belongs to me-
dium-sized countries. The specifics of its administrative division and each
level’s functions are derived from its size, but also from its traditions and
history.
Local government in the Czech Republic was, until 2000, present ex-
clusively on a gmina level. This was directly derived from the time in his-
tory during which the Czech Republic belonged to Austria-Hungary, and
when local government was being formed on a gmina level only. Athen-po-
wiat had a similar role as it does currently. A powiat does exist in the
Czech Republic, despite what opponents of dismantling powiats in Poland
say. It only has an organizational function to: courts, police, health care
and also serves statistical purposes. The second level of local government
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in the Czech Republic is, from 2000, a kraj (Siwek, 2010, p. 531, 542–543).
Thus references to the Czech Republic’s example, in argument for dis-
mantling of powiats in Poland, seem to be completely invalid.
There is therefore no doubt that Poland is slowly getting ready to start
a broad discussion on yet another administrative division reform. Perhaps
such debates would not have been needed if not for the political bargaining
that had happened in the Sejm in 1998, when for many politicians their
own interests were more important than the National interest. As a result,
the reform was halted halfway. There are too many voivodeships and also
powiats that are limited in their competences and own revenue. Over the
15 years of functioning of this broken reform, a lot of problems arose,
which politicians do not seem to notice.
Recently, however, there has been more and more studies on a state of lo-
cal-governance. The conclusions of these studies are not too optimistic
(Bober, Hausner, Izdebski et al., 2013; Rydlewski, 2014). Additionally, a de-
population process in many local territorial units results in a revenue de-
crease. Reducing the local territorial units’ income leads to a situation where
they cannot carry out their tasks. In local territorial units’ budgets, various
kinds of subsidies and grants start to dominate, which literally makes them
dependent on government. Their independence slowly starts to seem illusive.
In the recent months, there have been talks of a proposal of enacting,
by means of statute, a metropolitan powiat as a solution to powiats’ weak-
ness. It seems that the creators of this idea are trying to kill two birds with
one stone: no specific vision on metropolisation and problems in function-
ing of the Uppersilesian-D¹browa Coal Basin conurbation. The govern-
ment took a negative stand on this concept, yet the deputies are still trying
to push it through. In the Western Europe the same idea is based on the
principles of agglomerations and metropolis under voluntary cooperation.
They are always special-purpose associations and not units or levels of ter-
ritorial self-government.
Based on conducted research, the following conclusions can be made. Es-
pecially important to a country aspiring to a leadership role in this part of
Eastern Europe, and within the EU – to a role of one of the leading countries,
should be before anything else an efficient management of its own entity. This
could be done by a further territorial self-government reform, which should
be properly prepared using the experiences brought by the disputes over the
reform bills in 1998. Hence – the following ought to be done:
1) first of all, it is essential to reduce the number of voivodeships, mean-
ing – a comprehensive reform of the administrative division of the
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State is needed. Future units of the administrative division – regions
– should be based on geographical, historical and cultural criteria.
Newly founded units should be thus of a high territorial, social and
economic potential, and should be on a local and government – or ex-
clusively local – level. These units would allow a more efficient man-
agement of the country and would be able, in the constantly growing
European Union, to effectively compete for funds for regional devel-
opment, also after 2020 when the rules for obtaining funding will
change. A maximum number of voivodeships, to efficiently manage
the country, should be reduced to 9;
2) following the gminas example, the electoral law to the local powiat and
voivodeship councils should be changed and allow direct elections for
powiat starosts and voivodeship marshals. This would allow a strong
mandate to govern. Similar processes can be observed in many coun-
tries in which a powiat – as a level of a territorial self-government – ex-
ists, e.g. Germany;
3) maximum of two terms for gmina administrators, mayors and city
mayors, and after implementation of direct elections – also starosts and
marshals, which would strengthen the democracy at a local and re-
gional level, liven up the political scene and significantly influence the
development of gminas, powiats and voivodeships;
4) comprehensive change of the provisions on relations between legisla-
tive and executive bodies in gminas. Today’s provisions guarantee
a domination of: gmina administrators, mayors and city mayors – over
councils. These provisions make them also independent from the elec-
torate, and conflicts’ impasses do not promote gminas’ development
and their managing;
5) the powiat’s role ought by extended by providing similar to gminas
sources of revenue, which would allow powiats to take over some tasks
from voivodeships. At the same time, the number of powiats ought to
be reduced which would lead to creation of much bigger, in territorial,
social and economic terms, administrative units;
6) the quality of task delegations ought to be improved as well. Currently,
delegation of tasks to local government units are done without any
clear concept of local-government development;
7. In the event of changing the voivodeship’s character to a local-govern-
ment level only, changes in the public administration’s structures
ought to be done, by transforming the Senate to an institution that rep-
resents voivodeships. The representatives of voivodeships would be
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exclusively: marshals, vice-marshals and chairmen of the Sejmik.
A vice-chairman of the Sejmik and another vice-marshal could be
added – but this could only be allowed for voivodeships with larger
population. Thus, the number of voivodeship representatives in the
Senate ought to depend on the voivodeship’s total population;
8) in the event of changing the voivodeship’s character to a local and gov-
ernment one, the office of Voivode ought to be reduced to representing
the government in a voivodeship and also to make sure local govern-
ment units obey the law, and have a well-paid, competent and efficient
staff of officials;
9) a comprehensive public finance reform ought to be implemented, and lo-
cal government financing principles – with the amount (percentage-wise)
from particular source per each level of local government – ought to be in-
cluded in the Constitution and the acts on local government.
It is worth noting that these enumerated elements of the further local
government reform will not bring expected results if the economic issues
are not properly regulated. Without local government’s financial inde-
pendence, meaning – without own resources and budgets, the local gov-
ernment reform will be incomplete. Financial independence will also
allow to gain autonomy in regards to central administration. These issues
ought to be included in the Constitution as well, as a guarantee of integrity
and to stress the importance to the whole political and administrative sys-
tem of the country. Local and regional communities are entitled not only to
self-governance, but they also have a right to function within a well – and
effectively governed country.
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Czy potrzebna jest nowa reforma podzia³u administracyjnego?
G³os w dyskusji na temat reformy samorz¹du
Streszczenie
Przetaczaj¹ca siê przez ró¿ne œrodowiska w Polsce: samorz¹dowców, naukowców
zajmuj¹cych siê t¹ problematyk¹, polityków szczebla centralnego dyskusja na temat
koniecznoœci przeprowadzenia reformy podzia³u administracyjnego pañstwa polskie-
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go sk³ania do dokonania ogl¹du sytuacyjnego. Wszelkie dyskusje jakie siê w tej chwili
tocz¹ – z jednej strony – na poziomie w³adzy centralnej, a konkretnie w sejmie na te-
mat powiatu metropolitalnego wydaj¹ siê byæ oderwane od rzeczywistoœci i nakazuj¹
zadaæ pytanie czemu maj¹ te próby przeforsowania ustawy s³u¿yæ? Dodaæ nale¿y, ¿e
negatywne stanowisko w tej sprawie zaj¹³ m.in. rz¹d oraz liczne grono samorz¹do-
wców. Z drugiej zaœ strony pojawiaj¹ siê g³osy o likwidacji wzorem Republiki Czes-
kiej powiatów, czy te¿ propozycja powrotu do koncepcji podzia³u na 49 województw.
Czy Polskê staæ na kolejny eksperyment administracyjny? Reforma administracyjna to
nie tylko szczeble administracji, to tak¿e problem zarz¹dzania pañstwem. Spo³ecznoœci
lokalne i regionalne maj¹ prawo nie tylko do samorz¹dnoœci, maj¹ równie¿ prawo do
tego aby funkcjonowaæ w ramach dobrze i efektywnie zarz¹dzanego pañstwa.
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